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The Negotiable Instruments Law. Third Edition. By Joseph Doddridge Bran-
nan. Cincinnati, The W. H. Anderson Co. igo. pp. lxviii, 622.
The primary questions for any reviewer of a book are: What is it? and What
of it? The second question is easy to answer in the instant case: no man
who has to work with the law of negotiable instruments can afford to do without
Professor Brannan's new edition. The other question presents greater diffi-
culties.
Primarily, the book is a compendium of the decisions since the passage of
the N. I. L. It differs from compendia in general in that it is accurate, prac-
tically complete, and above all, usable. The cases are grouped in uniform
arrangement under the sections of the Law which, like the digests, are well set
off typographically. Dicta and decisions, cases which cite and cases which do
not consider the N. I. L., and, where important, the course of reasoning followed
by a court, are clearly indicated. Cross-references are generous; the requisite
tables of cases and corresponding sections, and an unusually adequate index,
are provided. And the arrangement of the digests, while its reason has not
always been apparent to the reviewer, is in the main such as to develop the
digests themselves into something of a coherent comment on the sections under
which they are grouped. Put in the hands of a law-school class, this material
provides a teaching adjunct to the case-book of whose value the first trial will
prove convincing.
So much of the book is easy to describe and estimate. But so far as the
new edition is a commentary on the law of bills and notes, it is not so easy to
discuss. The Ames-Brewster-McKeehan articles are, as before, (and very
properly) reprinted in full and are also summarized under the appropriate
sections. Scattered-with considerable frequency-through the book, are hints,
comments, and discussions of the author, references to periodical material, and
criticisms, at times exhaustive, of one or another set of decisions. All these are
valuable. The author's grasp is firm, his insight keen, and his discussion lucid.
The possibility of constituting a payee a holder in due course (pp. 5o ff., 162 ff.),
for instance; the negotiability of instruments payable in "currency" (pp. 27);
the procedural effect of possession of an unendorsed order note (pp. 154 ff.);
the effect of selling accommodation paper after its maturity (pp. 122ff.), and
of defects in title under sec. 59 (pp. 217-222) ; the rights (p. 332) and the duties
(pp. 24o ff.) of an anomalous endorser; the strange effect of sec. rig on a
surety-maker (pp. 313 ff.); the confusion of acceptance and promise to accept
(pp. 362 ff.) ; these and a goodly number of other important questions are ably
and helpfully treated. And the collections of cases-to instance a few-on
the effect of a check as an assignment (pp. 4o3), on the extension of a bank
credit as constituting value (pp. ioo ff.,. 17.1 ff.), on what constitutes "payment"
(pp. 318 ff., 365, and especially'28o ff.), and on the relation of draft and bill of
lading (especially pp. 227 f.), are particularly valuable.
But the omissions are at times puzzling. Perhaps one should be sufficiently
grateful to find periodical literature indicated at all, not to complain because
the references are almost without exception to the single REVIEw with which
Professor Brannan has of course been most closely in touch. And the book
does not purport, as does that of MacLaren, to provide the common-law back-
ground of the act it annotates. But in dealing with holes in the codification,
if common-law cases are inserted on payments made after maturity but without
notice in pursuance of a purchase concluded before maturity (p. 179), surely
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the omission of all discussion of the status of a post-dated check before its
due-day is to be regretted; or, for that matter, of the effect, pending maturity,
of making a note payable at a bank under sec. 87. A man of the author's
proved ability and learning could do much to make clear the parol evidence rule
in its effect on the contract of an endorser (cf. pp. 233 ff.) and, above all, its
effect on conditional delivery (cf. pp. 59ff.). Nor are the difficulties slight
which .are involved in notice of fiduciary relationship from the face of the
instrument (cf. pp. 194 ff.); in the question of payment "in due course" under
secs. 51, 88, 1ig; in the matter of the antecedent debt of a third person as con-
stituting value or consideration. One looks with interest and expectation for
Professor Brannan's views on such questions as these. It is a decided dis-
appointment not to find them. And one may well hope that it will not be long
before the profession is favored with a more thoroughly comprehensive treat-
ment from his pen of the multitudinous difficulties of negotiable paper. Perhaps
one may add a regret that the present book appeared too early to take notice of
Kelso & Co. v. Ellis (1918, N. Y.) 121 N. E. 364, (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
692, which has gone fir to bring New York in line, on the matter of a pledge
for an antecedent debt as constituting value.
To sum up: as a compendium of decisions under the N. I. L., Professor
Brannan's new edition is excellent-the best, on any subject, the reviewer has
seen-and well nigh indispensable; but it contains too much of too good a text
on bills and notes to be treated as a mere compendium, while not enough to
satisfy the desires and expectations which it itself arouses.
K. N. L.
The Renovation of International Law. By D. Josephus Jitta. The Hague, Mar-
tinus Nyhoff. igig. pp. xvi, 196.
This is a most remarkable book. Its author is well known in the juridical
world by his earlier works-La nuthode de droit international privi (189o) ; La
substance des obligations en droit international privi (19o6) ; and International
Privaatrecht (Ig6)-all of which will remain landmarks in the science of
private international law. In all of these, he has shown himself to be one of
the most original thinkers of our times. Before him, the problem of the conflict
of laws was deemed to be: which of several systems of law with which a legal
relationship is connected, is to determine its solution. The differences of
opinion related chiefly to the selection of the rule itself and to the ultimate
basis upon which these rules rested. Some looked at the subject from a
national point of view; others from an international viewpoint. Most of the
internationalists, following Savigny, found in international law only the limits
within which the legislation and jurisprudence of the individual states might
move. Zitelmann contended, on the other hand, that the rules of the conflict
of laws were to be derived directly frdm international law.
According to Professor Jitta, private international law is not the science
relating to the conflict of laws or law-givers "but the science of the juridical
relations between men in a community larger than a state" (p.n9g). The rules
of the conflict of laws are not imposed by the law of a particular state, nor of
the collectivity of states, i. e., international law, but by humanity itself, the
states being only the organs by means of which those rules are enforced.
"Every state, even when it is acting in isolation, is bound to recognize . . .
every juridical relation established in conformity with the requirements of the
reasonable order of international social life" (p. 91). The rule to be applied
to a given juridical relationship is the one which will permit it to fulfill its
social aim in humanity such as the state conceives it to be. Our author rejects,
therefore, the traditional rules-the lex loci contractus, the lex loci solutionis,
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etc., as too mechanical to answer the requirements of the complex international
social order. Professor Jitta admits that to the extent that a particular rela-
tionship belongs, in accordance with its peculiar nature, to a local sphere, it
will be subject to the law of such sphere of social life. If it does not belong
to such local sphere, the juridical relationship is submitted "to the international-
common rules of law if these are to be found, and when they are not, to the
reasonable principles of international social life, as a subsidiary source of positive
law" (p. 91).
These reasonable principles are outlined in the second part of the work under
consideration, with respect to the different problems in the conflict of laws.
Our author freely concedes that the reasonable principles are quite subordinate
to the positive law, but he aims to prove that they possess "not only a subsidiary
force and a large significance for the construction of the positive law, but that
they are the touchstone of the righteousness of the positive law and the final
aim of its evolution" (p. 2). Professor Jitta is conscious of the fact that the
"international-common" rules, as he calls them, and the reasonable principles
as subsidiary positive law, do not produce- certainty in the decisions, but he is
convinced that the way out of the difficulty is not by means of the establishment
of mechanical rules for the solution of the so-called conflict of laws, but in
the establishment of uniform rules through international conventions. He has
made his view clear in (i92o) 29 YALE LAw JouRitAL, 497.
While the views expressed in this part of the work are only a development
of the ideas originally formulated by Professor, Jitta in his work The Method
of Private International Law, he takes a step forward when he points out in
the first part of the work that the juridical community of mankind is also
the basis of public international law, provided that the positive law of war; the
rules of which, according to our author, cannot be deduced from reasonable
principles of social life, be separated from public international law. Both
public and private international law thus appear as a unity, having the same
legal basis, and in which the reasonable principles have the same significance:
"Public international law is not exclusively a complex of relations between
nations, it is the publid law, considered from the point of view of a community
larger than a State, a community embracing, in its extreme extension, all man-
kind; private international law is not exclusively the science of the conflicts
of laws, it is the private law considered from the same point of view" (p. 4).
The community of mankind in contrast with the community of states, is, in
the eyes of our author, a juridical and not merely a de facto-community. Its
juridical character is predicated upon the existence of- an enforcing power
consisting of (i) the State as the local representative of the public power of
mankind; (2) the union of several States representing mankind as a unity
larger than a State; (3) the collectivity of the States. To persons accustomed
to the Austinian theory of sovereignty, the views expressed by Professor Jitta
may appear to be those of a visionary; yet no assumption could be further from
the truth. There is probably no living writer who is more fully cognizant of
the realities of life than is Professor Jitta, or who understands better the
actual requirements of international intercourse. His mind rebels, however,
against the mechanical application of rules of law. Law to him is not a col-
lection of abstract rules, but a vital force arising directly from the social con-
ditions under which men live. So far as the intercourse among men has become
cosmopolitan, and it is becoming more and more so every day, it is necessary,
therefore, that a cosmopolitan law, a jus gentium as it were, be created,
It is the distinct merit of the work here discussed that it points out clearly
what is the present status of international law, both public and private, as
compared with its ultimate goal, and that it shows- us the progress that has
been made, the obstacles that lie in its way, and the reasonable hopes for its
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development in the future. Professor Jitta is a true cosmopolitan himself.
He has a thorough acquaintance with English, French, German and other systems
of law, and a perfect command of the English, French and German languages
besides his native, Dutch, tongue. Whatever the language in which he expresses
himself, his style is always vivacious and full of force. The present work is
addressed especially to the English speaking world and is written, therefore,
by the author in English.
We are grateful to Professor Jitta for having communicated his timely
message to us in our own tongue. The presentation in such an attractive
manner of an idealistic world order will help 'us all to lay aside our own
prejudices and to become more earnestly desirous of participating in any
movement that will bring mankind nearer to this goal.
ERNEST G. LORENZEN.
International Law. By Sir Frederick Smith. Fifth Edition. By Coleman
Phillipson. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co. i918. pp. 456.
Any English treatise on international law encounters the severe test of com-
parison with Westlake and Hall. Measured by that standard, the book under
review suffers. That is perhaps not unnatural in view of the method of its
evolution into its present form. Its first edition appeared in 1899 as a brief
manual. The second and third editions gradually enlarged it. The fourth
edition (1912) and the fifth edition, now under review, were not prepared by
the original author, but by independent editors. A work which thus began as
an unpretentious primer now challenges judgment by scientific standards. The
wonder is that it meets the test as well as it does, a merit principally due to the
excellent contributions of its present editor, Dr. Phillipson. The latter had
already published some valuable treatises and extracts from these, together
with much new matter of his, are found widely represented in the present text.
Aside from its heterogeneous construction, the book suffers the additional handi-
cap of having been prepared in time of war, a defect apparent throughout and
at times seemingly justifying Lord Salisbury's remark, quoted indeed by the
author, that "international law . . . depends generally on the prejudices
of the writers of text-books."
The author who, since the publication of the book under review, has become
the British Lord Chancellor under the title of Baron Birkenhead of Birkenhead,
has contributed a preface which consists principally of a vigorous denunciation
of Germany and a -demand for the trial of her war culprits and of praise of
the late Sir Samuel Evans, based largely on the latter's "profound intuition of
the foundations upon which (British) maritime greatness depends"; and he
compares Evans with Lord Stowell, "whose patriotism he equalled, and whose
ingenuity he excelled."
With respect to the main body of the work, it may be said that the historical
and informational treatment of international law is above the average. In a
compendium of less than five hundred pages it is not easy to discuss the many
topics within the vast field of international law, covering both their diplomatic
and their legal development, without a distribution of emphasis requiring a
good sense of proportion. The book meets this requirement as well as could
be expected, for while retaining its character as an elementary work; it does
frequently discuss at length controversial problems for which a specialist might
consult a general treatise.
And yet it is because- some of these problems, such as the naiure of interna-
tional law as law, are well discussed, that the failure to discuss others and the
absence of any critical attitude toward some of the recent phenomena in inter-
national practice-it is difficult to call it "law'"-excites attention and criticism.
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The explanation doubtless is to be found in the fact that the book has been
written from a national point of view. Its attitude toward British practice is
either uncritical, apologetic, sympathetic, approving or laudatory, whereas in
its consideration of the practice of foreign countries it is quite critical It is
interesting, for example, to contrast the respective descriptions of the absorp-
tion by Great Britain of Egypt (p. 57) and the annexation by Austria of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (pp. 36, 147). Its condemnation of German violations of
international law during the war is justly and deservedly severe. The editor
points out that "the use of new weapons in warfare is not permissible unless
provided for by the rules of international law; and no single nation, as an
American court said, may change the law of the sea" (p. 423). Yet he seems
to be nearly oblivious to the fact that the British Orders in Council changing,
by municipal legislation, long established rules of international maritime law
and restricting to a degree hitherto unknown the rights and privileges of neutrals,
even affecting trade by neutrals between neutral countries, constitute a serious
infringement upon international law, as the United States Government as a
neutral clearly and repeatedly asserted. The fact that a British Prize Court
sustained these Orders in Council, many of which were denominated "Reprisal
Orders"--a tacit admission of their illegality-seems to justify their validity
in the eyes of the editor (p. 253). Only once, in referring to that section of the
Order in Council of March 1I, 1915, which required every vessel bound to any
neutral port carrying goods suspected of German destination or ownership to
discharge them in a British port, does the editor admit that it "would not be
justified otherwise than as a retaliatory measure" (p. 32o). Great Britain
maintained during the late war that if one belligerent "is allowed to make an
attack upon the other regardless of neutral rights, his opponent must be
allowed similar latitude in prosecuting the struggle" and is not "limited to the
adoption of measures precisely identical with those of his opponent." This
seems to be the only point on which all belligerents appeared to be agreed.
No reference has been found to the important change effected by the Order
in Council shifting the burden of proof of enemy destination from the captor
to the shipper, who was required to sustain the most difficult burden of proving
that his goods would in human probability never reach the enemy, country.
Of the blacklist, no mention whatever is apparently made, and yet no measure
was more potent in controlling the trade of neutrals in every part of 'the
world. In the editor's explanation of the Orders in Council changing the rules
of blockade--changes not altogether without justification-he overlooks several
of the grounds of neutral protest., He might have added Sir Samuel Evans'
comment in the Hakan that the "blockade was not a blockade at all, except for
journalistic and political purposes." The reviewer might go on indefinitely
pointing out what he deems lapses in the correct appreciation and evaluation by
the editor of British war measures and their operation; he contents himself
with expressing regret that war conditions and the editor's patriotism necessarily
deprive him of the calm critical point of view which the writer of a scientific
treatise ought reasonably to be expected to possess.
Perhaps it is proper to call attention to a few obvious and important in-
accuracies. The editor states the effect of the decision of the Privy Council in
The Zamora (P. C.) [i916] 2 A. C. 77, to be that "the Prize Court administers
international and not municipal law, is not bound by Orders in Council," etc.
(pp. 50, 192). This would be important, if true, and the contemporary popular
press took pains to emphasize this independence of British Prize Courts from
municipal legislation. As a matter of fact, -the learned editor must be aware
that the Zamora decision applied not to legislation or even to executive Orders
in Council in execution of legislation, which always control a prize court, but
solely to prerogative Orders in Council and even as to them the proclaimed
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mitigation of Crown rights in favor of the captured vessel has been considerably
impaired by the decision in The Proton (P. C.) [I918] A. C. 578, which in this
connection is not mentioned. See (igig) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 585. The
effect of the decision of Point i in the Fisheries Arbitration is not accurately
described (p. 17). While Newfoundland can enact fishing legislation for
certain waters independently, its reasonableness is open to question by the
United States and (should the United States request) must be passed upon by
an arbitrator before it can come into force. Although the editor calls attention
to the French Admiral Aube's suggestions. as to bombardment of coast towns
(p. 215) he does not mention the Admiral's epoch-making suggestion in the
same article (Revue des Deux Mondes, i882) of the attack and sinking by
submarine torpedo of passenger vessels as an effective war measure. The ex-
planation of the sinking of the German cruiser Dresden in Chilean territorial
waters (p. 294) differs considerably from the Chilean view. The editor's
apparent belief that armed merchant ships are entitled to the same immunities
as unarmed ships (p. 424) is no longer entertained by many leading authorities.
While a merchant vessel undoubtedly has the privilege of arming, contrary to
the German view, she does thereby, it is believed, forfeit her immunity from
unwarned attack by enemy war vessels. To conclude otherwise would be to
give the armed ship a position of remarkable security, not attainable or to be
expected in war, and to overlook the effect of numerous decisions.
Since i918, when the book was published, many changes or additions have
been engrafted on the fabric of international practice, notably by the Treaty of
Versailles, and by the high sanction thereof, doubtless characterizable as "law."
Many of these innovations constitute such serious departures from what we
have conceived to be well. settled principles, for example, those relating to the
treatmenf of private property, or such astonishing reversions to long obsolete
practice, that one's confidence in the stability of any "rule" of international
law is badly shaken. The harm in this practice is more than immediate.
International law like all law has been observed because mankind has by
experience learned that in the long run it is better to have as nearly as possible
a guide of consistency and principle in the conduct of human relations, rather
than to permit expediency and passing advantage to dictate conduct and policy.
Law is itself a restraint upon the strong and a protection to the weak, a guide
to. the doubtful and an insurer of general -safety. Its ministers always have
then a standard to uphold. Notwithstanding the frequency of wars, international
law had in the past century grown stronger from generation to generation. That
was because at the end of each war there was a renewed dedication to legal
principles and a steady gain in certainty was tobe noted. Now, however, some
of the elemental props of the legal structure have been loosed. It has been
apparently deemed profitable to throw off the restraints of law for what seems
a momentary advantage of self-interest. Experience will test the wisdom of
the step. When force or expediency, and not law, becomes the arbiter of human
destiny, civilized society has lost its standards and the precedent i& likely to be
exploited.
E. M. B.
